Today’s developments point to a familiar theme in African extractives: infrastructure unlocks opportunity.

Large projects such as Barrick’s Lumwana expansion in Zambia, Rovuma LNG in Mozambique and Uganda’s petroleum build-out do more than add production. They create processing capacity, logistics networks, power infrastructure and operating ecosystems that can lower the cost of developing surrounding resources and attract a second wave of investment.

But greater activity also demands greater vigilance.

The emerging questions around uranium contained in DRC cobalt hydroxide illustrate why regulators, operators and investors need to understand exactly what is moving through these increasingly sophisticated mineral supply chains. Concentrates and intermediate products may contain valuable by-products, hazardous materials or other characteristics that alter their commercial, regulatory and environmental risk.

For regulators, that means ensuring that what leaves the country is properly identified, accounted for and governed. For capital allocators, it means recognising that infrastructure and processing capacity can improve project economics while also introducing risks that may affect market access, compliance costs, offtake arrangements and ultimately project value.

The opportunity is therefore not simply to identify where new infrastructure is making African resources more financeable. It is also to ask whether the regulatory, technical and commercial systems around those resources are keeping pace with the activity being unlocked.

That is the lens through which to read today’s developments.

Today we are watching that question play out through Congolese cobalt and uranium, Zambia’s expanding copper ecosystem, Rovuma LNG’s approach to final investment decision, Uganda’s emerging petroleum infrastructure, Kokoseb’s transition toward financing and Tullow’s increasingly concentrated capital-allocation strategy.

DRC cobalt exports raise a deeper question: who captured the uranium value?

A new Nature Communications study has identified a potentially important blind spot in the economics of the DRC cobalt supply chain.

The authors estimate that 2,000–5,000 tonnes of natural uranium may have left the country between 2000 and 2024 embedded in cobalt hydroxide, with roughly 65% of those estimated flows going to Chinese-owned companies.

The finding is strategically sensitive, but it needs careful interpretation.

The study does not establish that Chinese refiners deliberately structured cobalt purchases to obtain cheap or undeclared uranium. Nor does it show that uranium in those shipments was secretly recovered for strategic use. The estimates are modelled, not based on direct assays of every shipment, and the DRC government has announced further investigation.

The more interesting question may be economic: Was the uranium recognised and priced when the cobalt hydroxide was sold?

If not, the transaction may effectively have contained two commodities:

cobalt hydroxide + embedded uranium → cobalt products + potentially recoverable uranium.

There is precedent. The study notes that between 2010 and 2017, Kokkola Chemicals in Finland recovered uranium from DRC-origin cobalt material and sold it.

That matters because mining contracts routinely distinguish between payable metals, by-product credits and impurities. If uranium was technically recoverable but excluded from the pricing formula, some mineral value may have transferred downstream without compensation to the Congolese producer.

The China share is therefore relevant, but it should not be overstated. Using the midpoint of the study’s estimate implies roughly 2,275 tonnes of uranium contained in material flowing to Chinese-owned buyers over the period. That is not the same as 2,275 tonnes of economically recoverable uranium; recovery depends on grade, metallurgy, plant design and cost.

The broader asymmetry may be more important.

The DRC bears the upstream liabilities associated with uranium-bearing ores — radiation management, worker exposure, tailings and environmental risk — while any recoverable secondary value may accrue further downstream.

That raises a policy question: Should uranium in copper-cobalt ores be treated only as a contaminant, or also as a secondary mineral whose economic value should be recognised?

Why it matters

For investors and lenders, the immediate risk is whether the findings lead to tighter testing, certification, buyer requirements or compliance costs for DRC-origin cobalt.

For governments and operators, the bigger issue is resource-value accounting. If valuable by-products are not identified and reflected in project economics or sales contracts, producing jurisdictions may export more value than their headline commodity statistics reveal.

Extractives Daily view: the key question is not whether China was covertly acquiring uranium. The evidence does not establish that.

The more consequential question is whether the DRC has historically exported a potentially valuable secondary mineral without consistently monetising it at the point of sale.

If so, the issue is ultimately about who controls processing, who writes the sales contract and who captures the value hidden inside the concentrate.

Sources: Nature Communications — Uranium in cobalt-hydroxide exports from the Democratic Republic of the Congo · Financial Times — DR Congo launches probe into uranium-contaminated cobalt exports

DRC tightens its push for domestic mineral processing

The Democratic Republic of Congo has prohibited exports of copper and cobalt concentrates under a government order intended to increase domestic processing and retain more value from the country’s mineral production.

Limited one-year waivers may still be granted in strategic circumstances.

The immediate effect will not be uniform. Much of the DRC’s copper is already processed domestically, but projects dependent on concentrate exports or without sufficient access to local processing capacity may be more exposed.

The measure nevertheless reinforces a broader policy direction: Kinshasa is becoming increasingly willing to use export controls and regulatory intervention to influence where and how mineral value is captured.

Why it matters

A project can be technically feasible and economically attractive under one processing and export configuration yet materially less attractive if government policy subsequently requires additional domestic beneficiation.

That can affect:

capital expenditure → treatment costs → logistics → working capital → financing requirements → project returns.

Processing strategy therefore increasingly needs to be considered not simply as an engineering decision but as a sovereign-risk assumption embedded in the project financial model.

Extractives Daily view: investors should pay particular attention to projects whose economics depend heavily on cross-border or offshore processing. Those assets are most likely to reveal the true capital impact of the policy.

Source: Reuters — Congo bans exports of copper and cobalt concentrates

Lumwana anchors Zambia’s next copper expansion cycle

Barrick’s US$2 billion Lumwana Super Pit expansion is designed to roughly double processing capacity from 27 million to 52 million tonnes a year and increase average annual copper production from about 120,000 tonnes to 240,000 tonnes over the life of the mine. Barrick has also planned supporting infrastructure including an airstrip and industrial supplier park, alongside a substantial construction and workforce ramp-up.

The expansion matters in the context of Zambia’s much larger ambition to raise national copper production to 3 million tonnes a year. Industry representatives told Reuters that more than US$10 billion of mining investment has been attracted since 2021, helped by tax reforms and improved engagement between government and miners.

But the next phase of growth is increasingly constrained by issues outside the mine gate.

Miners are calling for stronger incentives for exploration, mineral processing, local manufacturing and value addition, while power supply has emerged as one of the biggest bottlenecks. Industry executives estimate Zambia may need at least 2,000 MW of additional generating capacity to support its copper-production ambitions.

Why it matters

Lumwana demonstrates how a large anchor project can do more than increase copper output.

The mine’s expansion can support a wider ecosystem of contractors, suppliers, transport, power, engineering and service businesses, while infrastructure built for a major operation can reduce development barriers for surrounding projects.

But Zambia’s 3-million-tonne target will not be achieved by large expansions alone. It requires a continuing pipeline of exploration discoveries, sufficient processing capacity, reliable electricity and a stable investment regime capable of supporting both major producers and the projects that follow them.

Extractives Daily view: Lumwana is becoming an anchor for Zambia’s next copper investment cycle. The more important question is whether the infrastructure, suppliers and power capacity being built around projects like Lumwana begin to improve the economics of the wider Copperbelt and North-Western Province.

If they do, the value of the expansion will extend well beyond Barrick’s additional tonnes. It will begin to lower the cost of bringing the next generation of Zambian copper projects into production.

Sources: Barrick — Lumwana Super Pit expansion · Reuters — Zambia miners look to continued copper expansion

Rovuma LNG moves closer to execution as ExxonMobil lines up contractors and local capacity

ExxonMobil, which holds a 25% indirect interest in Mozambique’s Area 4 and will lead construction and operation of Rovuma LNG, is continuing to advance the project toward a final investment decision in 2026.

The project has now reached an important execution milestone. On 10 August 2026, the Area 4 partners issued a letter of intent to the SMDC joint venture — Saipem, McDermott, Daewoo E&C and China Petroleum Engineering & Construction Corporation — for limited engineering and procurement work supporting Phase 1 of the onshore LNG development.

The current design envisages 12 modular liquefaction units with total capacity of 18.6 million tonnes of LNG a year, with start-up anticipated in 2031. ExxonMobil says the project could generate about US$150 billion in government revenues over a 30-year operating life, although those figures remain project estimates rather than realised benefits.

At the same time, the consortium is investing US$40 million in the Centro Tecnológico de Moçambique, a training centre in Maputo intended to prepare Mozambicans for technical and operational roles in LNG, construction and infrastructure. The facility is expected to train up to 250 people a day and is being built by Mozambican contractor 7 Mares.

Why it matters

Rovuma is beginning to move from project preparation toward execution readiness.

Selecting an EPC consortium, advancing engineering and procurement work, and building local workforce capacity are all steps that typically precede large-scale capital deployment. They do not constitute FID, but they reduce execution uncertainty and indicate that the sponsors are preparing the supply chain and operating ecosystem needed if the project is sanctioned.

For Mozambique, that distinction matters. The opportunity is not limited to future LNG production. A project of this scale can create demand across engineering, procurement, construction, logistics, marine services, training, accommodation, maintenance, insurance and local contracting.

Extractives Daily view: the most important signal is that Rovuma is no longer only a prospective LNG megaproject waiting for a board decision. The sponsors are progressively assembling the contractors, skills and execution capacity required to turn FID into actual construction.

The key milestone remains final investment decision. If that is taken, the story shifts rapidly from project development to one of Africa’s largest prospective capital-deployment programmes.

Sources: ExxonMobil — Rovuma LNG · ExxonMobil — Rovuma LNG development update

Uganda’s oil build-out is taking shape as a full export system

TotalEnergies’ Uganda operations centre on the Tilenga development and the East African Crude Oil Pipeline, alongside CNOOC’s Kingfisher project in the Lake Albert basin. Tilenga is designed around six fields and roughly 400 wells, feeding a central processing facility at Kasenyi before crude enters the 1,443-kilometre EACOP pipeline to Tanzania’s coast.

At the export end of that system, construction of the Marine Storage & Terminal facility in Tanga has reached an advanced stage. The terminal includes four crude-storage tanks with total capacity of about 2 million barrels, export pumping systems, power infrastructure and a jetty connected to the onshore terminal by a two-kilometre trestle. Supporting electrical, instrumentation, telecommunications and security systems were reported as complete, while mooring and berthing infrastructure was about 85% finished at the time of the January 2026 inspection.

The facility was scheduled to enter commissioning from the first quarter of 2026.

Why it matters

The significance is not simply that Uganda is approaching first oil.

What is being assembled is a complete petroleum corridor:

upstream fields → processing → heated pipeline → storage → marine terminal → international export market.

That substantially changes the commercial character of Uganda’s oil resources because one of the largest barriers to monetisation — a route to market — is being physically built.

It also creates a broader industrial platform around engineering, logistics, storage, maintenance, power, marine services, contracting and cross-border infrastructure.

Extractives Daily view: Uganda and Tanzania are moving from resource development into infrastructure integration. The important next question is whether this system remains dedicated primarily to the initial Lake Albert projects or begins to support wider petroleum, logistics and industrial activity along the corridor.

If the latter occurs, EACOP and Tanga could become more than project infrastructure: they could begin functioning as regional energy infrastructure.

Sources: TotalEnergies — Uganda and the Tilenga project · Uganda Broadcasting Corporation — Tanga marine storage and terminal infrastructure

Namibia’s Kokoseb moves from study-stage project toward execution readiness

Wia Gold has raised A$92 million (N$1.1 billion) to accelerate development of the Kokoseb Gold Project in Namibia, giving the company a much stronger balance sheet as it approaches completion of a definitive feasibility study in the second half of 2026.

The capital raise was completed through a placement of 200 million new shares at A$0.46 per share, with commitments from institutional and sophisticated investors. The proceeds are earmarked not just for additional drilling, but for early works, pre-production capital expenditure, metallurgy, permitting, environmental and social programmes, and other execution-readiness activities.

Why it matters

This moves Kokoseb beyond the usual junior-mining pattern of raising modest amounts merely to keep drilling.

Wia is now funding the work needed to de-risk the project ahead of a development decision. In practical terms, the company is trying to bridge the gap between a promising resource and a construction-ready asset.

The next important question is therefore not whether Wia can fund the DFS. It is what the DFS says about full development capex, operating costs, project returns and the remaining financing requirement after the A$92 million raise.

Extractives Daily view: Kokoseb is becoming a financing case study. The latest equity raise has reduced near-term funding risk and allowed Wia to push into early works and pre-production planning, but the eventual mine build will still require a larger capital solution. The next milestone is to see how much of that requirement can be covered through project debt, strategic capital or other financing once the DFS is complete.

Further reading: Market Watch Namibia — funding injection for Kokoseb

Tullow raises cash-flow outlook as Ghana becomes the centre of its portfolio

Tullow Oil has raised its 2026 free-cash-flow forecast to $170 million–$250 million, up from $70 million–$175 million, after stronger production from its Ghana fields, better-than-expected oil-price realisations and progress recovering money owed by the Ghanaian government.

The company now expects annual production at the top end of its 34,000–42,000 barrels of oil equivalent per day guidance range. In the first half, Tullow realised an average oil price of about $95 per barrel before hedging and $86 after hedging, with hedging costs of roughly $47 million.

The improvement comes as Tullow continues to reshape itself around Ghana. It has sold assets in Gabon and Kenya, refinanced debt, and secured extensions to its flagship Jubilee and TEN licences through 2040, giving it greater visibility for further drilling and production.

Why it matters

The story is less about higher oil prices alone and more about portfolio concentration beginning to translate into stronger cash generation.

Tullow has reduced its geographic spread, focused capital on producing Ghanaian assets and strengthened the longevity of those assets through licence extensions. If higher output and improved collections from the Ghanaian government persist, the company has greater capacity to reduce debt and fund further development from internally generated cash.

Extractives Daily view: Tullow is becoming a useful example of how an extractives company can improve financial resilience by shrinking its portfolio around assets that already generate cash. The next question is whether the stronger free cash flow is used primarily for deleveraging or whether it begins to support a new phase of drilling and investment in Jubilee and TEN.

Source: Reuters — Tullow raises annual cash-flow outlook

Ghana revokes three Adamus mining leases over alleged regulatory breaches

Ghana’s Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources revoked Adamus Resources’ mining leases over the Akango, Salman and Nkroful concessions after investigations by the Minerals Commission found what the government described as serious breaches of mining law and permit conditions.

According to the Ministry, Adamus allegedly subcontracted mining operations without ministerial approval, conducted mining without approved operating plans or valid permits from the Chief Inspector of Mines, and failed to secure required regulatory approvals including from the Environmental Protection Agency. The government also alleged the unlawful involvement of Chinese nationals in mining activities on the concessions.

Adamus rejected the allegations. The company said it remained properly licensed, held the necessary Minerals Commission and EPA approvals, and was operating in compliance with Ghanaian mining law. It also challenged the process, arguing that it had not been formally notified of the allegations or given an adequate opportunity to respond before the revocation.

Why it matters

The dispute is significant because it turns what might otherwise look like routine compliance failures into a direct mineral-title and investment-security issue.

For operators, it shows that subcontracting, operating plans, environmental approvals and permitting are not merely administrative matters; breaches can ultimately threaten the underlying mining right itself.

For investors and lenders, the case reinforces the need to assess not only whether a company holds a valid licence, but whether its operating practices are capable of preserving that licence throughout the life of the investment.

Extractives Daily view: the Adamus case is ultimately about the durability of mineral rights. Where regulatory compliance is weak or contested, title risk can quickly translate into cash-flow risk, financing risk and impairment of the asset itself.

Source: Ghana News Agency — Adamus challenges revocation of three mining leases

WHAT TO WATCH NEXT:

The most important signals emerging from today’s developments lie at the intersection of infrastructure, capital and sovereign policy.

Zambia: Watch whether major copper investments begin improving financing conditions for smaller surrounding assets and service businesses.

Mozambique: Watch whether Rovuma reaches final investment decision and proposed expenditure begins turning into actual contracts and capital deployment.

Uganda and Tanzania: Watch whether the emerging petroleum corridor begins generating secondary investment beyond the initial upstream and pipeline projects.

DRC: Watch whether concentrate-export restrictions and radiological concerns around cobalt begin affecting project economics, buyer requirements, financing documentation or market access.

Namibia: Watch how development-stage gold projects such as Kokoseb structure the transition from feasibility into construction finance.